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Labor Market Policy Evaluation with ACE
Michael Neugart∗
Abstract
I develop an agent-based computational economics (ACE) model
with which I evaluate the aggregate impact of labor market policies.
The findings are that government-financed training measures increase
the outflow rate from unemployment to employment. Although the
overall effect is positive, this effect is achieved by reducing the outflow
rate for those who do not receive subsidies. Furthermore, the outflow
rate would have been downward-biased had one supposed a matching
function that is exogenous to policies.
Keywords: Labor market policy evaluation, agent-based computa-
tional model, endogenous matching function, job displacement
JEL Classification: C63, J61, J68
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1 Introduction
The objective of labor market policies is at least twofold: to provide benefits
to those people who are unemployed in order to cushion their income loss,
and to improve the allocation of workers to job openings in the labor market.
The former usually goes under the heading of passive labor market policy
whereas measures that follow the second aim are usually referred to as active
labor market policies. As table 1 shows, a considerable amount of money is
spent on labor market policies in OECD countries each year. The interest in
the effectiveness of those policies follows quite naturally.
Nowadays, there is considerable microeconometric evidence on the effects
of training measures for individuals, mainly about whether it improves an
individual’s chance of finding a job, about how it has an impact on wages,
and sometimes also about its stabilizing role on lifetime employment and
income (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1999). However, studies based on micro-
data cannot tell us what the aggregate effects of those labor market policies
look like. As has been proposed by Garfinkel et al. (1992), Calmfors (1994),
Schmid et al. (1996), and the OECD (2005), the aggregate impact of labor
market policies might be smaller than what evaluations on the individual level
suggest because deadweight losses and substitution and displacement effects
of labor market policies are not taken into account. This is why studies based
on micro-data should be complemented by aggregate impact studies of labor
market policies in order to arrive at sound public policy recommendations.
In this article I link individual and aggregate impact studies with an
agent-based model of the labor market. In particular, I address three issues:
a) I evaluate the aggregate impact of government training subsidies, which,
as table 1 reveals, make up a considerable share of active policies; b) quantify
how a policy that improves an individual’s chances of finding a job harms
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those who do not receive government transfers; and c) point out that eval-
uating labor market policies within flow models that depend on matching
functions that are exogenous to the labor market policies under investigation
may result in biased results.
Following up on the first issue, I intend to add to an existing literature
that studies the aggregate impact of training policies an alternative method-
ology (as suggested by Freeman, 2005, among others for policy evaluation)
that complements the use of flow models and the estimation of aggregate
matching functions (see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Bellmann and
Jackman, 1996, respectively). The second topic is, in my estimation, a poten-
tially interesting contribution that agent-based models can make in linking
micro- and macro-level evaluations. Micro-evidence is not informative when
it comes to judging the macroeconomic consequences of labor market policies.
In addition, a mere look at aggregate variables does not allow one to make
inferences about to what extent the success of a program of a treated group
of individuals comes at a cost for the non-treated. By its very construction,
an agent-based labor market model allows the extraction of information on
the individual level and the aggregate level. Thus, job displacement effects
of labor market policies can be studied. The third result questions the use
of matching functions as a key building block in flow models of the labor
market. Matching functions relate two stock variables, jobseekers and va-
cancies, to outflows from unemployment (a flow variable). The properties
usually attributed to the matching function are outflows as an increasing
and concave function of the inputs to the matching function, and constant
returns to scale. Moreover, those properties are usually seen as exogenous to
policies. Here I raise the concern that if one takes a micro-foundation of the
matching function seriously, namely, that policies target the agents’ choices
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and that the properties are driven by firms’ and workers’ search decisions,
then one should also expect that properties of the matching function change
under the auspices of different policies. A failure to take into account that
the matching function is endogenous to policies might lead to biased results
in aggregate impact studies of labor market policies.1
Butters (1977) and Hall (1979) were among the first to provide a micro-
foundation of the matching function on the basis of a coordination failure
argument exemplified by the so-called urn-ball model. From that point of
departure many roads have been taken to add more structure to either the de-
mand side or the supply side of the market, or to introduce models of wage
determination in order to study the properties of the endogenous match-
ing function.2 Agent-based approaches to matching functions were made
by Tesfatsion (1998), Richiardi (2004), and Fagiolo et al. (2004). In Neu-
gart (2004) I showed within an agent-based computational economics (ACE)
framework what properties for an endogenous matching function arise if there
is endogenous vacancy creation, endogenous search intensity, and a wage for-
mation such that heterogenous workers are paid their reservation wages. I
also hinted towards the possibility of policies affecting the properties of the
matching function, an issue that has been pointed out by Lagos (2000) before.
The model with which I address the three issues is an agent-based com-
putational model of a labor market with different sectors.3 Firms in those
sectors have sector-specific skill requirements. Sectors are hit by exogenous
1Examples of evaluations of labor market policies with an exogenous matching func-
tion can be found in Mortensen (1994), Pissarides (1998), and Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001), who look at the effects of unemployment benefit systems. Job protection legis-
lation, active labor market policies, and a negative income tax system were analyzed by
Pissarides (2001), Mortensen (1996), and Coe and Snower (1997), respectively.
2Work in this direction has been done by Cao and Shi (2000), Julien et al. (2000), Bur-
dett et al. (2001), Albrecht et al. (2003), and Smith and Zenou (2003). A comprehensive
survey of the matching function is provided by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
3For an introduction to agent-based modeling, see, for example, Tesfatsion (2006).
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shocks. In such an event firms close down, dismissing their employees. As
sectors are differentiated by skill requirements, unemployed workers have to
make an upfront investment in their human capital in order to qualify for
vacancies opening up in other sectors. The government subsidizes the unem-
ployed workers’ human capital investment, which is financed by a tax on the
employed.
The findings are that subsidizing training increases the outflow rate from
unemployment to employment and reduces the unemployment rate. Further-
more, dividing the group of jobseekers into a treatment and a non-treatment
group shows that a higher outflow rate of the treated jobseekers comes at the
cost of a lower outflow rate of the non-treated. Finally, had I supposed an
exogenous matching function, the aggregate impact of the government policy
on the outflow rate from unemployment would have been underestimated.
In the following section I describe the model. Section 3 presents the
results, and the last section summarizes my findings.
2 The model
There shall be numSectors sectors in the economy, allocated on a circle (see
figure 1). The number of firms in the labor market is numFirms, with
numFirms > numSectors. Firms in sector i have different skill require-
ments from firms in sector j, with i 6= j. Skill differentiation varies with the
distance between sectors. Assume numSectors = 10; then from the perspec-
tive of the sector i = 0, sectors numbered 1 and 9 would be closest in terms
of the skill requirements of the firms, whereas sectors 2 and 8 would require
skills more distinct from what is needed in sectors 1 and 9, and so on. Each
firm posts one vacancy. If the firm can fill its vacancy, it produces output.
5
Page 6 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
The returns from production are fully paid out to the workers in terms of a
fixed wage wage.
Initially firms and workers are randomly allocated to sectors. With prob-
ability r sectors are hit by shocks. All firms in the sector hit by a shock close
down. Workers in those firms become unemployed. A number of firms equal
to the number of closing firms is opening up in local labor markets that were
not hit by the current shock.4 Again, those firms are allocated randomly to
the new sectors. Because the number of firms is held constant, aggregate
labor demand is constant, too. In other words, the shocks considered are
asymmetric.
Firms that have a vacancy on the market and received applications ran-
domly choose one applicant, to whom they make an offer. The worker always
accepts the first offer that he gets. The order in which firms are allowed to
make offers is random, approximating the simultaneous actions of the firms.
Thus, it may happen that a firm that received multiple applications cannot
fill the vacancy because all applicants were hired by other firms, or that a
vacancy is not filled because no worker applied.
0
1
2
3
4
...
numSectors -1
Figure 1: Allocation of sectors in the labor market
The number of workers in the market equals the number of firms. Thus,
4Sectors hit by a shock, however, may be populated by firms again in the future.
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in principle there could be full employment. Workers are heterogenous in
terms of their skill endowments, their initial skills determined by the random
allocation to a sector. Unemployed workers can make an upfront human cap-
ital investment. If they decide not to invest in their human capital, they can
only apply for vacancies that are posted in the sector in which they worked.
However, if they make an upfront investment in their human capital of the
size of one unit, they would also qualify for vacancies posted in sectors 1 and
9, assuming that they are currently located in i = 0 and numSectors = 10.
A human capital investment of the size of two units would, in addition, qual-
ify the worker for jobs in sectors 2 and 8. The human capital investment is
costly. Acquiring skills that qualify the worker for the adjacent two sectors
implies costs humCapInvCost. An investment in the worker’s human capi-
tal that would qualify him for the closest additional four sectors incurs costs
2 · humCapInvCost, and so on. Workers may want to make upfront hu-
man capital investments up to the point at which they qualify for all sectors
(0 ≤ numHumCapInv ≤ numSectors/2).5 A worker shall send applica-
tions to all firms that have vacancies with skill requirements that match the
worker’s skills. An unemployed worker who makes an upfront human capital
investment, but does not find a job in the current period, will have to invest
in his human capital again in order to qualify for job openings outside his
past field of work.
Workers learn how much they should invest in their human capital when-
ever they become unemployed or do not find a job. I model this as a process
of individual reinforcement learning.6 In the initial stage, a worker chooses
the amount of human capital investment from the strategy set with equal
5I assume that numSectors is an even number.
6Another option to model learning on the individual level is genetic algorithms; see
McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) or Dawid (1999). Brenner (2006) extensively discusses
the pros and cons of various learning models.
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probabilities. Then, workers keep track of the payoffs that accrued to them
after the choice of a distinct human capital investment strategy. As time
evolves each worker experiences from market outcomes that some strategies
work better than others. The performance measure is the average of payoffs
of each strategy accruing in periods in which a worker had to look for a new
job (whether successful or not). Let numHumCapInv denote a human capi-
tal investment strategy; then an unemployed worker k will choose a strategy
h = numHumCapInv with probability
p(k, h) =
eλ·payOffAve(k,h)∑numSectors/2
s=0 e
λ·payOffAve(k,s)
, (1)
where λ > 0 is a learning parameter, reflecting the speed of learning, and
payOffAve(k, h) is a worker k’s average payoff for a strategy h. A learning
mechanism like the one proposed in equation (1) has the characteristic that
application strategies that led to relatively high payoffs are more likely to be
chosen.7
The role of the government is to subsidize training. The government re-
funds a share of the human capital investment costs to the unemployed work-
ers. Unemployed workers receive a rebate of rebate = numHumCapInv ·
humCapInvCost ·workerPolicy, having invested in numHumCapInv units
of skills at a cost of humCapInvCost, with workerPolicy being the fraction
of costs refunded. The government shall finance the policy through a tax on
workers’ wages. It tries to run a balanced budget. After every period, the
government adjusts the tax rate that will be in effect in the following period
such that the tax would have balanced the budget in the current period. Fig-
ure 2 presents the pseudocode of the model summarizing the main elements
7Equation 1 is known as the Gibbs-Boltzmann probability measure.
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and the sequence of actions taken by the agents.
3 The results
3.1 Aggregate impact of training policies
I simulate a labor market that consists of 20 sectors, each having different
skill requirements; 100 firms, each posting one vacancy; and 100 workers. A
local labor market is hit by a shock with probability r = 0.05. Productivity
and hence wages are normalized to one. Costs for investing in one’s human
capital shall be 15% of the quarterly wage for one unit of human capital.
This implies that in order to acquire the skills most distinct from the current
endowment, the worker would have to invest 10 units, given that there are
20 sectors. In this case, human capital investment costs would amount to
150% of the quarterly wage. The learning parameter is λ = 10.
A single iteration involves the steps summarized in the pseudocode (see
figure 2). An iteration is repeated 1000 times, which makes up a run. After
each run new initial conditions are set and a new run begins. What is re-
ported are the values of the last iteration of each of the 5000 runs that were
conducted.
In figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 the histograms for the number of vacancies posted,
the number of jobseekers, outflows from unemployment to employment, and
the unemployment rate are plotted. The histograms refer to the case without
government training policies. Summing up the observations that are plotted
into the histograms yields the number of runs conducted, namely 5000.
On average the unemployment rate is 10.7% (see first row in table 3). The
average inflow rate and the quarterly calibration imply an average duration
of jobs of five years. The average outflow rate implies an unemployment
9
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duration of slightly less than a year.8 Each vacancy receives on average 2.6
applications, which could be considered too small given casual evidence on
employers being inundated with applications, but note that by assumption
workers send applications only to vacancies for which they qualify. The sum
of human capital investment translates into 5% if measured as a share of
total output, or put differently, an unemployed worker on average invests
into almost three units of human capital. Tightness shows that on average
there are 0.66 vacancies for an unemployed worker. Compared with cross-
country evidence this ratio seems to be too high (see OECD, 2001). Overall,
however, the properties of the labor market model appear to be reasonable.
Table 3 summarizes the findings of the labor market policy evaluation.
Increasing the subsidy for the training costs for the unemployed workers from
zero to 50% in steps of 10 percentage points lowers the unemployment rate
from 10.7% to 8.2%. The decline in the unemployment rate is driven by
an increase in the outflow rate from unemployment to employment given a
constant inflow rate from employment to unemployment. As it becomes less
costly for the unemployed to invest in training, more training is undertaken.
The sum of human capital investments increases from 29.5 units to 49.8
units. Additional training qualifies the unemployed for jobs with skills that
are more distinct from those of the jobs they currently hold. Consequently,
they will apply for job openings in sectors that are more distant in terms of
skills from those sectors in which they currently work. This is reflected in
the increase in the average number of applications per unemployed person,
8While it might be tempting to compare the outcomes of the model also with flow data
on labor markets (see, e.g., Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM), International
Labour Office Geneva, 2007), one should be aware of the sensitiveness of the simulation
results with respect to the calibration time of the underlying model. In the future, less
stylized models may investigate perhaps more realistic approaches where firms and workers
are more flexible with respect to the timing of their decisions as the labor market unfolds.
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as shown in the last column of table 3. Thus, a government subsidizing
training reduces unemployment. Unemployment is reduced because lower
training costs encourage unemployed workers to invest more in their human
capital. As a consequence they qualify for job openings in sectors for which
they otherwise would not have been qualified.9 In short, the training policy
reduces frictional unemployment due to skill mismatch.
Quite importantly, this result is not sensitive to the magnitude of the
costs for the human capital investment. Increasing humCapInvCost reflects
again the driving mechanism of the model, frictional unemployment due to
a skill mismatch. The results are not shown in the table. However, as the
costs for human capital investments increase, unemployment goes up driven
by a lower outflow rate from unemployment. The decrease of the outflow
rate is caused by a smaller amount of human capital investment that lowers
the average applications sent out by a worker.
Whereas we have empirical knowledge on the size of most of our param-
eters listed in table 2, the choice of the learning parameter is debatable. Re-
ducing the learning parameter to half of the size of the baseline model yields
a decrease of the unemployment rate for all government policy parameters.
The lower unemployment rates are driven by higher average outflow rates.
Behind the higher outflow rates are increased human capital investments and,
consequently, a higher average number of applications per person. However,
although a less strong feedback mechanism distorts the levels of the endoge-
nous variables, the effects are still small enough to argue that the magnitudes
of the endogenous variables are reasonable. Doubling the size of the learning
9While the subsidies reduce the costs for training that raises transitions to employment,
employment may become less attractive from the perspective of an unemployed worker as
the employed finance the training policy. However, this effect is comparably small as the
tax on the income of employed persons amounts to 4% on average when the subsidy is
50%.
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parameter with respect to the baseline model results in an increase of the
unemployment rate for all government policy parameters. The outflow rates
are somewhat lower, as are human capital investments and applications per
vacancy, but again, and more important, quite considerably increasing the
size of the learning parameter with respect to the baseline model, leaves the
qualitative results of the baseline simulation unaffected. It is still the case
that as the government takes over a higher share of the training costs, the
unemployment rate decreases. Thus, with respect to the learning parameter,
evaluation results of the training policy appear to be robust. Moreover, for
given learning parameters, increasing the number of time steps from 1000
to 2000 does not distort the results shown in table 3 that suggest that the
system has converged.
3.2 Endogenous matching function
A matching function relates the two stock variables, vacancies and jobseekers,
to the flow variable outflows from unemployment. In policy evaluations this
relationship is assumed to be exogenous to the policies under investigation.
A policy that is targeted to change the behavior of agents is assumed not
to affect the properties of the matching function. For the same inputs the
matching function is supposed to deliver the same number of outflows from
unemployment. However, what happens if the policy changes the properties
of the matching function? Will not taking into account that policies might
change the relationship between jobseekers and vacancies on the one hand
and outflows from unemployment on the other hand lead to biased results
in policy evaluations? If so, one would have a situation in which the policy
alters the properties of the matching function, leading to a situation in which
for equal inputs, outflows differ.
12
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The agent-based model developed here does not make use of an exoge-
nous matching function, so it becomes possible to shed some light on whether
there is an issue of biased evaluation results. Whether policies change the
properties of the matching process in the labor market can easily be checked
by comparing the outflow rates in the model with a training policy with
the outflow rates in the model without a training policy for (almost) equal
inputs. The simulation generated 5000 observations for the treatment and
each non-treatment case. From those observations I extract triples of job-
seekers, vacancies, and outflow rates, where the two inputs to the matching
function, jobseekers and vacancies, match between the treatment and the
non-treatment case. I say that the inputs match if the absolute deviation
of the inputs between the treatment and the non-treatment case is smaller
than two. Table 4 illustrates this procedure. After the comparable cases had
been extracted, a Wilcoxon-test was applied in order to check for the null
hypothesis of equal distributions of outflow rates.
In all five treatments, the average outflow rate is higher than in the non-
treatment case where there is no government policy (see table 5). Thus,
the policy improves the matching process in the labor market. The shift in
the distribution of outflow rates is, moreover, statistically significant. Again,
I checked for the robustness of the results when the learning parameter is
doubled and reduced to half of the size of the baseline case.10 A matching
function endogenous to labor market policies still seems to be an issue.
3.3 Job displacement effects
The model also can be used to shed light on the relationship between treat-
ment effects on the individual level and the macroeconomic outcome. Al-
10Those results are not given in this article.
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though a training policy might increase the chances of those jobseekers who
receive subsidies, it might do so by reducing the job-finding rates of those
who are not covered by the program. Job displacement effects in the sense
that the treated jobseekers crowd out other jobseekers who are not benefit-
ing from a labor market policy program might reduce the overall success of
a policy. I attempt to quantify the effect within the agent-based model by
dividing the workers into equally sized groups, one of treated and one of non-
treated workers. If a worker from the treated group becomes unemployed,
he will receive government subsidies for his human capital investment. The
workers from the non-treated group do not receive transfers. The following
experiment was then conducted (see also figure 7): the number of itera-
tions is increased to 2000, whereas all other parameters are identical to the
baseline simulation. In the first 1000 iterations, no subsidies are given for
jobseekers’ human capital investments, neither for the treatment nor for the
non-treatment group. The outflow rates at iteration 1000 are noted for both
groups. From iteration 1001 to 2000, jobseekers who belong to the treatment
group receive a transfer from the government of 50% of their human capital
investment costs. Finally, the outflow rates at iteration 2000 for both groups
are stored again. The experiment was repeated 5000 times.
Table 6 summarizes the mean values for the outflow rates for the treated
and the non-treated group before and after the government policy was im-
plemented. First of all, it can be seen that jobseekers of the treatment and
the non-treatment group have equal outflow rates before the policy was in-
troduced. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal outflow rates, as
shown in the last row of the first column. A comparison of the mean outflow
rates for the treatment group before and after the government policy was
introduced reveals that on average the policy increases the job-finding rate
14
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from 0.257 to 0.374. Testing against the null hypothesis of equal outflow
rates, the difference turns out to be strongly statistically significant. Also in
economic terms the effect is strong: the outflow rate of the treated group of
jobseekers increases by 45%. If there were no substitution effect, the mean
values of the outflow rates of the non-treatment group should be equal before
and after the policy was introduced. This is, however, not the case. Again,
one can clearly reject the null hypothesis of equal outflow rates. The substi-
tution effect is also economically relevant. The outflow rate of the jobseekers
who do not receive government subsidies is reduced by 12%.11 A sensitivity
analysis with respect to the choice of the learning parameter does not change
the qualitative nature of the results.12
What is the interpretation of the job displacement effect? In this model,
it is driven by a reduction of the treated jobseekers’ human capital investment
costs. As the costs are reduced, workers in the treatment group invest more,
allowing them to apply for jobs that are more distant in terms of skills from
their current human capital resources. In those sectors where the treated
workers would not have applied without government transfers, they compete
for jobs with workers who did not receive transfers. Those workers might
not get a job offer because a treated worker was given that offer. Thus, the
job-finding rate of the non-treated group declines.
One may wonder how other policy measures fare with respect to the
displacement effect. In an extension to the described model the effect of
unemployment benefit policies on the transition probability of an unemployed
worker into a job was analyzed. In order not to compare apples with pears
the following approach was taken. With the parameters as in the previous
11In more technical terms, one would claim that the stable unit treatment value as-
sumption (SUTVA) is violated; see Rubin (1974) for an early discussion of causal effects
in experiments.
12Again, those tables are not included in this article.
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experiment, one can calculate the average budget of the government needed
to finance the training policy, and this average budget was taken as exogenous
to the unemployment benefit program. Then, the taxes for the employed
and the transfers to the unemployed were determined endogenously given
the number of unemployed in the economy. One finds that an unemployment
benefits policy that has the same budget as the training policy does not affect
the transition rates. The reason for this finding is straightforward. Contrary
to the training policy, unemployment benefits do not give an incentive to
invest in one’s human capital. Thus, labor market frictions due to skill
mismatch are not reduced.13
4 Conclusions
For the purpose of an aggregate impact study of government-sponsored train-
ing policies that rank prominently among active labor market policies in
OECD countries, I developed an agent-based labor market model with sector-
specific skill requirements. In the model, firms are hit by asymmetric shocks,
and workers becoming unemployed have to invest in their human capital in
order to qualify for job openings. The government steps in and subsidizes the
workers’ training costs. First, I show that the subsidizing of training increases
the outflow rate from unemployment and reduces the unemployment rate on
the aggregate level. Second, there is evidence that the matching technology
is not exogenous to policies. This has consequences for aggregate impact
studies of labor market policies. In my case, not taking into account that
policies change the matching properties of the labor market would have led
to an underestimation of the impact of the training policy on the outflow rate
13More detailed results are available from the author.
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from unemployment. Third, I show how an agent-based labor market model
can be used to elaborate potential job displacement effects of labor market
policy programs, an evaluation exercise that closed-form analytical models
are less apt to achieve. An agent-based approach is especially promising
here, because information about the program effects on the individual level
and the aggregate level is available. Exploiting this property of an agent-
based approach, I find that the training policy reduces the job-finding rate
of those who do not benefit from the program to an economically significant
extent. In other words, although those individuals receiving transfers have
a higher probability of leaving unemployment and although the overall im-
pact of the program on outflow rates is positive, there is a crowding-out of
non-participants of the program.
In many respects this study employed strong modeling assumptions. How-
ever, the approach of evaluating labor market policies with agent-based mod-
els allows for a range of extensions that could alleviate some of the assump-
tions made in this work. For example, one could analyze the role of market
power on the side of the firms or workers (c.f. Tesfatsion, 2001) and its im-
pact on labor market performance. Different wage-setting institutions should
be analyzed, and although the current study focuses on training policies, it
might also be of interest to compare those policies to alternative measures.
Various other unemployment benefit schemes or the effectiveness of job pro-
tection legislation are only two examples of social policies that deserve further
attention. Another unexplored link is the effect of labor market policies on
the distribution of firms and employment across sectors, with its repercus-
sions for employment dynamics.
17
Page 18 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the participants at the research seminar of the Evolu-
tionary Economics Group at the Max Planck Institute for Economic Systems
Research, Jena; at the research seminar of the Department of Economics
at Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt; and at the ACEPOL05 Workshop on
Agent-Based Models For Economic Policy Design at the Center for Inter-
disciplinary Research (ZIF) at the Universita¨t Bielefeld, as well as Gu¨nther
Schmid and two anonymous referees for their suggestions. Of course, I am
responsible for all errors.
References
Albrecht, J., P. Gautier, and S. Vroman (2003): “Matching with
multiple applications,” Economics Letters, 78, 67–70.
Bellmann, L. and R. Jackman (1996): “Aggregate impact analysis,”
in International Handbook of Labour Market Policy Evaluation, ed. by
G. Schmid, J. O’Reily, and K. Scho¨mann, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
143–162.
Brenner, T. (2006): “Agent learning representation: Advice on mod-
elling economic learning,” in Handbook of Computational Economics, ed.
by K. Judd and L. Tesfatsion, Amsterdam: North-Holland, vol. 2, 895–948.
Burdett, K., S. Shi, and R. Wright (2001): “Pricing and matching
with frictions,” Journal of Political Economy, 109, 1060–1085.
Butters, G. (1977): “Equilibrium distribution of sales and advertising
prices,” The Review of Economic Studies, 44, 465–491.
Calmfors, L. (1994): “Active labour market policy and unemployment –
a framework for the analysis of crucial design features,” OECD Economic
Studies, 22, 7–47.
Cao, M. and S. Shi (2000): “Coordination, matching, and wages,” Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, 33, 1009–1033.
Coe, D. and D. Snower (1997): “Policy complementarities: the case for
fundamental labor market reform,” IMF Staff Papers, 44, 1–35.
Dawid, H. (1999): Adaptive Learning by Genetic Algorithms: Analytical
Results and Applications to Economic Models, Berlin: Springer, 2nd edi-
tion.
18
Page 19 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Fagiolo, G., G. Dosi, and R. Gabriele (2004): “Matching, bargaining,
and wage setting in an evolutionary model of labor market and output
dynamics,” Advances in Complex Systems, 7, 157–186.
Fredriksson, P. and B. Holmlund (2001): “Optimal unemployment
insurance in search equilibrium,” Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 370–
399.
Freeman, R. (2005): “Labour market institutions without blinders: the
debate over flexibility and labour market performance,” NBER Working
Paper No. 11286.
Garfinkel, I., C. F. Manski, and C. Michalopoulos (1992): “Mi-
cro experiments and macro effects,” in Evaluating welfare and training
programs, ed. by C. F. Manski and I. Garfinkel, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 253–273.
Hall, R. (1979): “A theory of the natural unemployment rate and the
duration of employment,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 5, 153–169.
Heckman, J., R. Lalonde, and J. Smith (1999): “The economics and
econometrics of active labor market programs,” in Handbook of Labour
Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, vol. 3A, 1865–2097.
Julien, B., J. Kennes, and I. King (2000): “Bidding for labor,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 3, 619–649.
Lagos, R. (2000): “An alternative approach to search frictions,” Journal of
Political Economy, 108, 851–873.
McFadzean, D. and L. Tesfatsion (1999): “A C++ plaform for the
evolution of trade networks,” Computational Economics, 14, 109–134.
Mortensen, D. (1994): “Reducing supply-side disincentives to job cre-
ation,” in Reducing Unemployment: Current Issues And Policy Options,
Kansas City: The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 189–219.
——— (1996): “The unemployment and income effects of active labor market
policy: A U.S.-U.K. comparison,” inMore Competition, More Jobs - Is Full
Employment an Illusion?, ed. by C. Draeger, P. Pissulla, and A. v. Czege,
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 157–180.
19
Page 20 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Mortensen, D. and C. Pissarides (1999): “New developments in models
of search in the labour market,” in Handbook of Labour Economics, ed. by
O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Amsterdam: North-Holland, vol. 3B, 2567–
2627.
Neugart, M. (2004): “Endogenous matching functions: an agent-based
computational approach,” Advances in Complex Systems, 7, 187–202.
OECD (2001): Employment outlook, Paris: OECD.
——— (2005): Employment outlook, Paris: OECD.
Petrongolo, B. and C. Pissarides (2001): “Looking into the black
box: a survey of the matching function,” Journal of Economic Literature,
XXXIX, 390–431.
Pissarides, C. (1998): “The impact of employment tax cuts on unemploy-
ment and wages; the role of unemployment benefits and tax structure,”
European Economic Review, 42, 155–183.
——— (2001): “Employment protection,” Labour Economics, 8, 131–159.
Richiardi, M. (2004): “A search model of unemployment and firm dynam-
ics,” Advances in Complex Systems, 7, 203–221.
Rubin, D. B. (1974): “Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized
and nonrandomized studies,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 66, 688–
701.
Schmid, G., J. O’Reilly, and K. Scho¨mann (1996): International
Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, (Eds.), Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Smith, T. and Y. Zenou (2003): “A discrete-time stochastic model of job
matching,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 6, 54–79.
Tesfatsion, L. (1998): “Preferential partner selection in evolutionary labor
markets: a study in agent-based computational economics,” in Evolution-
ary Programming VII, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on
Evolutionary Programming, ed. by V. Porto, N. Saravanan, D. Waagen,
and A. Eiben, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 15–24.
——— (2001): “Structure, behavior, and market power in an evolutionary
labor market with adaptive search,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 25, 419–458.
20
Page 21 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
——— (2006): “Agent-based computational economics: A constructive ap-
proach to economic theory,” in Handbook of Computational Economics,
ed. by K. Judd and L. Tesfatsion, Amsterdam: North-Holland, vol. 2,
Agent-Based Computational Economics, 831–880.
5 Appendix
The model is programmed in RePast. The code is available from the author
(neugart@wz-berlin.de).
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Table 1: Labor market policy expenditures in OECD countries in 2002
Country Total Active LMP Traininga Training
in % of GDP in % of GDP in % of GDP in % of active LMP
Austria 1.78 0.53 0.19 35.8
Belgium 3.65 1.25 0.19 15.2
Czech Republic 0.45 0.17 0.02 11.8
Finland 3.07 1.01 0.27 26.7
France 3.06 1.25 0.21 16.8
Germany 3.31 1.18 0.32 27.1
Hungary 0.90 0.52 0.06 11.5
Italy 1.20 0.57 - -
Japan 0.76 0.29 - -
Korea 0.41 0.27 0.04 14.8
Netherlands 3.56 1.85 0.52 28.1
New Zealand 1.52 0.52 0.14 26.9
Norway 1.41 0.87 0.05 5.7
Slovak Republic 0.94 0.46 0.04 8.7
Spain 2.42 0.87 0.12 13.8
Sweden 2.45 1.4 0.28 20.0
Switzerland 1.30 0.53 0.12 22.6
United Kingdom 0.75 0.37 0.01 2.7
United States 0.71 0.14 0.03 21.4
a: Training includes course costs and subsistence allowances for unemployed adults
and those at risk. Special training programs for youths and disabled persons are
excluded.
Source: OECD labor market statistics, http : //stats.oecd.org.
Table 2: Parameters
Parameter Value
Number of Sectors numSectors = 20
Number of Workers numWorkers = 100
Number of Firms numFirms = 100
Probability for Random Shock to Sector r = 0.05
Wage wage = 1
Cost for One Unit of Human Capital humCapInvCost = 0.15
Learning λ = 10
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Create sectors 
Create firms and allocate them randomly to sectors 
Create workers and allocate them randomly to sectors 
for n periods 
 Job destruction 
 for each sector 
  with probability r sector is hit by shock 
  workers lose jobs 
firms hit by shock are relocated 
 end each sector 
Applying 
for each unemployed worker 
makes upfront human capital investment 
  sends applications to all vacancies for which he qualifies 
 end each unemployed worker 
 Hiring 
 for each vacancy 
  randomly draw vacancy to be filled 
  if workers applied 
firm randomly selects worker who did not yet receive offer 
from application list 
  else  
vacancy is not filled 
 end each vacancy 
 Workers learn 
 if worker unemployed or has found job 
  for each such worker 
for each human capital investment strategy 
    calculate average payoffs 
choose new human capital investment strategy 
   end each human capital investment strategy 
  end each such worker 
 else 
 no individual learning 
Tax adjustment 
Government adjusts tax following balanced budget rule 
end n periods 
Figure 2: Pseudocode
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Figure 3: Histogram of the number
of vacancies
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Figure 4: Histogram of the number
of jobseekers
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Figure 5: Histogram of outflows
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Figure 6: Histogram of unemploy-
ment rates
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Figure 7: Experiment with respect to job displacement effects
24
Page 25 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Table 3: Average labor market effects of government-sponsored training
Baseline model: λ = 10
workerPolicy unRate inflowRate outflowRate humCapInvSum appliPerVac tightness appliAve
0 0.107 0.054 0.260 29.5 2.61 0.66 1.63
10 0.101 0.054 0.275 32.5 2.95 0.64 1.78
20 0.094 0.055 0.288 35.9 3.38 0.61 1.93
30 0.091 0.053 0.287 39.8 3.83 0.57 2.01
40 0.087 0.053 0.305 44.4 4.45 0.54 2.22
50 0.082 0.053 0.316 49.8 5.20 0.51 2.45
Sensitivity analysis: λ = 5
workerPolicy unRate inflowRate outflowRate humCapInvSum appliPerVac tightness appliAve
0 0.095 0.054 0.289 35.6 3.33 0.61 1.88
10 0.092 0.054 0.300 38.6 3.70 0.59 2.01
20 0.089 0.055 0.304 41.8 4.10 0.57 2.14
30 0.085 0.053 0.312 44.6 4.47 0.55 2.21
40 0.085 0.055 0.323 49.9 5.17 0.52 2.45
50 0.081 0.055 0.326 53.2 5.68 0.50 2.57
Sensitivity analysis: λ = 20
workerPolicy unRate inflowRate outflowRate humCapInvSum appliPerVac tightness appliAve
0 0.116 0.053 0.229 25.8 2.30 0.66 1.47
10 0.109 0.051 0.240 28.9 2.59 0.64 1.58
20 0.101 0.055 0.260 33.2 3.14 0.61 1.85
30 0.097 0.054 0.273 37.8 3.70 0.57 2.01
40 0.089 0.054 0.289 42.7 4.29 0.53 2.23
50 0.086 0.056 0.303 50.9 5.44 0.50 2.60
Table 4: Outflow rates comparing treatment and non-treatment cases with
workerPolicy = 50
No. workerPolicy = 0 workerPolicy = 50
of observation jobSearchers vacSum outflow rate jobSearchers vacSum outflow rate
1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
13 5 3 0 6 4 0.17
14 15 7 0.27 14 7 0.50
15 5 5 0.20 4 4 0
16 5 2 0.20 5 1 0.20
17 14 11 0.36 13 11 0.54
18 16 16 0.50 16 16 0.94
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
N ... ... ... ... ... ...
Note: Parameters were set as in baseline model.
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workerPolicy
10 20 30 40 50
∆ average outflow rates 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.17
(p-value) 0.015 0.025 0.003 0.000 0.000
N 177 163 149 161 145
Note: N is the number of observations; p-value refers to two-sided test; parameters were
set as in baseline model.
Table 6: Job displacement effect
Means of outflow rates
Before After t-testa on equal means
Treatment group 0.257 0.374 0.000
Non-treatment group 0.260 0.229 0.000
t-testa on equal means 0.308 0.000
a: Reported are p-values; number of observations N = 4493.
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